Mesechtas Terumot

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Mesechtas Terumot has 11 chapters. The Mesechtas deals with the separation of terumah and its laws.

Contents of the Mesechtas[edit | edit source]

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Nullification of Terumah in One Hundred and One[edit | edit source]

Regarding the laws of nullification of terumah in one hundred and one, a law dealing with how terumah is nullified in one hundred and one, we learned in Mesechtas Terumot:

Rabbi Yehoshua says black figs elevate the white ones, white ones elevate the black ones [5500/1740]. Rabbi Eliezer forbids this [5500/1740], and Rabbi Akiva says if it is known what fell (black or white), they do not elevate each other, but when it is not known what fell, they elevate each other [5500/1740].

The reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer who forbids this law is simply understood, because in reality the terumah was only mixed with fifty, and either way there aren't one hundred of the type that fell. Commentators wrote that Rabbi Yehoshua holds that since if one wanted, he could crush and mix them all together, therefore they all combine to nullify it.

Regarding Rabbi Akiva's reasoning for distinguishing between when it is known what fell and when it is not known, they wrote that when it is known which fig fell, black or white, "they do not elevate because one can eat the others, and since they are permitted, they do not help to nullify. But if it is not known whether a black one fell or a white one fell, since all are in doubt of prohibition, they elevate each other."

This reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshua is difficult: what does it matter "that if one wanted, he could crush and mix them all together"? In reality, he did not grind and crush them, so how do they elevate each other?

Rabbi Akiva's opinion also requires explanation: what does it matter if no one knows whether it was black or white and "all are in doubt of prohibition"? This doubt is only in a person's knowledge, but in reality - the terumah was not mixed with one hundred (since a white fig does not mix with a black fig (and vice versa), and in the language of Tosafot "the black ones cannot be in doubt of mixture because black ones are always recognizable among white ones"); so there is no mixture of one in one hundred here.

Mixture in the Object or in the Person[edit | edit source]

The Rebbe resolves and explains that Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Akiva disagree about the general definition of nullification in a dry-in-dry mixture - which is unlike a wet-in-wet mixture, which is a real mixture where they become one reality that cannot be separated. Different from this is a dry-in-dry mixture where each remains separate, except that a person doesn't know where the forbidden item is. We can explain the nature of this mixture in two ways:

A) The nature of a dry-in-dry mixture is indeed different from a wet-in-wet mixture, as it is not a mixture in the object itself but only from the perspective of the person, meaning in a person's knowledge there is a mixture of forbidden and permitted, but this is enough to nullify the prohibition.

B) Even a dry-in-dry mixture is in the object itself, because the definition of "mixture" is that one cannot distinguish between the permitted and forbidden.

This is the reason for the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer (who forbids) and Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva: Rabbi Eliezer holds that even the definition of a dry-in-dry mixture needs to be in the object itself, and therefore he holds that the white figs cannot elevate the black ones (and vice versa), since there is no mixture in reality, and as mentioned above in Tosafot's language, they cannot mix because they are always recognizable as separate.

But Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva hold that for a dry-in-dry mixture, it is sufficient when it is only from the perspective of the person - in the person's knowledge. This is also Rabbi Akiva's reasoning for holding that "when it is not known what fell, they elevate each other" - because of the mixture in the person's knowledge, and in this case, in his knowledge they are mixed in all one hundred.

Based on this, the Rebbe also explains Rabbi Yehoshua's reasoning that all combine to nullify it because "if one wanted, he could crush and mix them all together" (even though he did not crush and mix them): Crushing figs is (not just in the category of "if one wanted" generally, but this is) the common way for everyone to crush figs; and since a dry-in-dry mixture is the mixture in the knowledge and thought of the person, Rabbi Yehoshua holds that since it is common and therefore in one's desire to crush the figs, in the person's will (and thought) he does not separate and divide between the black and white ones, and therefore there is a mixture of all one hundred in the will and thought of the person.

Jerusalem Talmud's Opinion[edit | edit source]

In the Jerusalem Talmud, there is a dispute regarding Rabbi Yehoshua's opinion about whether one type of produce can nullify another when it is known which one fell (whether Torah or white fig), or whether when it is known which one fell, even Rabbi Yehoshua holds that they do not nullify each other. According to this interpretation, the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva is that Rabbi Yehoshua believes that since one forgot, it's as if it was unknown at the time it fell, while Rabbi Akiva holds that since one knew at the time it fell, they do not nullify each other, even though one later forgot. The Rambam, who ruled according to Rabbi Akiva, also ruled in accordance with the Jerusalem Talmud, that if one knew what had fallen after it fell and then forgot, all are considered mixed with terumah and do not nullify each other.

According to this, Rabbi Akiva's reasoning is seemingly difficult to understand: why when one knew and forgot are all considered mixed with terumah and do not nullify each other, since now they are all in the category of doubtful prohibition? And one cannot say that since the fifty were already mixed with terumah (when one knew), they cannot be nullified afterwards when one forgot - because it is explicitly stated in the Mishnah: "If one se'ah of terumah fell into less than one hundred (se'ah) and afterwards non-sacred produce fell there, if one did so unintentionally, it is permitted." This means that even though initially there were not one hundred to nullify and they became mixed with terumah, when more fell there unintentionally afterwards, they combine to nullify. So why don't we say here too that when one forgot, they are all in the category of doubtful prohibition and combine to nullify each other?

The Knowledge of the Person Affects the Object[edit | edit source]

The Rebbe explains that according to the Jerusalem Talmud and the Rambam's ruling, Rabbi Akiva's reasoning represents a third approach to the nature of a dry-in-dry mixture. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, the entire definition of the mixture depends solely on the person's knowledge and thought, but Rabbi Akiva holds that although the foundation of a dry-in-dry mixture is based on the person's knowledge and thought, the state of the person's knowledge affects the actual physical object. This is the Torah's innovation regarding the law of dry-in-dry mixtures: even though from the perspective of reality itself, the prohibited item is not actually mixed with the permitted one but merely cannot be distinguished on its own, and therefore the foundation of the mixture's definition is based on the state of the person's knowledge, this state of knowledge causes a change in the reality of the object, as if they were actually mixed.

Therefore, the application of the laws of mixtures based on a person's knowledge only applies when one did not know at the time of the falling; then we say that the mixture that exists in the person's knowledge causes the application of the laws of mixtures, as if it fell into one hundred. But when at the time of falling one knew, meaning that in the person's mind the black and white figs were not mixed, the subsequent forgetfulness cannot create something new in the figs, since from the perspective of the figs themselves, the white and black ones are not mixed, and forgetfulness cannot uproot this reality (nor can it uproot the person's knowledge at the time of falling, when he knew whether a black or white fig fell).

In other words: For a person's knowledge to effect a law in the physical object, the black and white figs, which are not mixed in their essential nature, there needs to be a change in the figs themselves, that fell either black or white, whereby a mixture is created in reality, as the black fig is among the black ones. Then, when it is not known which of them fell, the mixture in the person's mind creates a mixture in the figs into which a fig of terumah fell. But when one knew and forgot, the person's forgetfulness does not mix the figs that in reality are not mixed.

The Rebbe explains the reason this concept, that a person's knowledge and thought can affect something outside of himself, is specified regarding terumah specifically - because the fundamental law that thought has effect is expressed regarding terumah, as learned from the verse "And your terumah shall be reckoned unto you as the corn from the threshing floor," from which we learn that terumah can be designated by thought alone. And although this case is not discussing the law of separating and sanctifying terumah but the law of its nullification, whereby the figs become permitted for consumption, nevertheless this stems from the fact that in the laws of terumah, a person's thought has special power.

Instruction in Divine Service[edit | edit source]

From this, the Rebbe teaches an instruction regarding the great value of a person's knowledge and thought, both in the negative side - how careful one must be about negative thoughts, because in addition to the severity of the matter itself, it also harms the world around him - and in the greatness and necessity of positive thought, to think about the welfare of others, because in addition to helping through actual deed or speech, thought also helps greatly.

Additional Explanations[edit | edit source]

  • Chapter 4, Mishnah 8. Black figs elevate the white ones and white ones elevate the black ones. Likkutei Sichos p. 60 (p. 71)
  • Jerusalem Talmud Chapter 4, Halacha 7. Likkutei Sichos Vol. 38 p. 62 (p. 74)

Explanations of the Tzemach Tzedek[edit | edit source]

  • Admor the Tzemach Tzedek, "Mesechtas Terumot", Tzemach Tzedek on the Shas, Brooklyn, 5755, pages 24-54, on the HebrewBooks website