Surrender and Decisiveness (Intellectual)

This entry deals with ways of choosing between different intellectual understandings. If you intended a different interpretation, see Surrender (definitions).

The decision between intellectual reasoning sometimes comes from intellectual considerations and sometimes from will. When it comes from intellectual considerations it is called surrender and when it comes from will it is called decisiveness.

Surrender of the Intellect

This aspect is like the metaphor of a scale, where when weight increases in one pan more than the other, the first will outweigh the second, but nevertheless the second pan still remains in existence. In the analogy (in intellect), even though a judge sees liability for the litigant, nevertheless because his merits outweigh them, the side of merit subdues the side of liability. But this is not a transformation; it is merely a submission (where the side of liability submits to the side of merit but it still exists as liability just as it was).

Decisiveness of the Intellect

The Torah forbade taking bribes because "bribes blind the eyes of the wise and distort the words of the righteous"[2]. And since the Torah here refers to the judges of Israel with praise – calling them wise and righteous, it is clear that it does not intend, G-d forbid, to suspect they would deliberately pervert Torah judgment from innocent to guilty or from guilty to innocent, for this would violate Torah law itself – so what does this have to do with taking bribes?

Rather, the issue is that through taking a bribe, the liability appears very small in his eyes until he doesn't see it at all. Why? Because taking the bribe creates a connection between the judge and the litigant, and things can reach the point where the judge puts himself in the litigant's place. And since "a person doesn't see his own liability"[4], the judge also doesn't feel the liability of the litigant.

This doesn't mean that he knows it's a liability and deliberately refuses to see it, but rather that due to his self-love, he doesn't see the liability at all. Because of this connection, any liability appears small in his eyes for correct intellectual reasons, as if it's not a liability at all. Therefore, this isn't considered violating Torah law, since he rules based on intellectual reasons that are in themselves correct and true.

This intellectual bias comes from will, as the will transforms the intellect completely – and this is called decisiveness of the intellect from liability to merit. That is, when will prevails over intellect, it happens in a way that transforms its very essence – the same intellect and reasoning that previously showed liability now shows merit. As we find regarding the flood: initially "the wickedness of man was great"[5] led to "I regret that I made them"[6]. And afterward (through Noah offering a sacrifice that was a pleasing aroma to G-d), it is written "I will not continue etc."[7] for the reason that "the inclination of man's heart is evil from his youth"[8]. This is the very same reason that brought the flood – so what new development caused "I will not continue etc."? This means that through Noah's sacrifice and G-d smelling his offering, G-d's will inclined toward him, and through this the very same reason for liability was completely transformed into a reason for merit!

Their Significance in Divine Service

This is the concept of a good eye and an evil eye, as the Zohar states, "There are two eyes that become one"[9]. That is, when one looks at another with a good eye, their liabilities become nothing and are not considered anything, as they are not seen as liabilities at all, while their merits become greatly magnified in substance and importance, seeing them very clearly as they expand greatly.

Conversely, when one looks with an evil eye at another, their merits appear very diminished in value, to the point that one doesn't see merit at all, while their small liabilities appear as substantial and great debts. This is like the metaphor of a father: when he is favorably disposed toward his son, as is natural, even a great wrongdoing will not be considered such a great liability in his eyes, and he will greatly minimize it by finding reasons and logic why it isn't a liability at all, while he will expand the son's few merits into something substantial and great, appearing as a very great merit because he looks with a good eye (and through this, even all the great liabilities are not seen as such great liabilities, and his merits are very apparent). This is not the case when it is the opposite, when he is angry with his son and looks at him with an evil eye; then it is reversed – every small wrongdoing appears great in his eyes.